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Self-referentiality in Justification Logic
Nathan Sebastian Gass Thomas Studer
Disclaimer. This paper contains several mistakes. A revised version is under
progress.
Note, however, that the counterexample in Section 4.3 is valid. It is correct that
prehistoric cycles in G3s are not sufficient for needing a self-referential CS.
Abstract
The Logic of Proofs, LP, and other justification logics can have self-
referential justifications of the form t:A(t). Such self-referential justifica-
tions are necessary for the realization of S4 in LP. Yu discovered prehis-
toric cycles in a particular Gentzen system as a necessary condition for
S4 theorems that can only be realized using self-referentiality. It was an
open problem whether prehistoric cycles also are a sufficient condition.
The main results of this paper are: First, with the standard definition
of self-referential theorems, prehistoric cycles are not a sufficient condition.
Second, with an expansion on that definition, prehistoric cycles become
sufficient for self-referential theorems.
1 Introduction
Sergei Artemov [1, 2] first introduced the Logic of Proofs, LP. He replaced the
-modality of S4 with explicit proof terms to obtain a classical provability se-
mantics for intuitionistic logic. Later more applications of this explicit notations
were discovered for different epistemic logics [4]. So Artemov [3] introduced the
more general notion of justification logics where justification terms take over
the role of the proof terms in LP. In any justification logic t:A is read as t is a
justification of A, leaving open what exactly that entails. Using different axioms
and different operators, various different justification logic counterparts where
developed for the different modal systems used in epistemic logic (K, T, K4, S4,
K45, KD45, S5, etc.).
In justification logics it is possible for a term t to be a justification for a
formula A(t) containing t itself, i.e. for the assertion t:A(t) to hold. Prima
facie this seems suspicious from a philosophical standpoint as well for more
formal mathematical reasons. Such a self-referential sentence is for example
impossible with an arithmetic proof predicate using standard Go¨del numbers as
the Go¨del number of a proof is always greater than any number referenced in
it as discussed by Roman Kuznets [12]. In the same paper, the author argues
that there is nothing inherently wrong with self-referential justifications if we
understand the justifications as valid reasoning templates or schemes, which of
course then can be used on themselves.
1
Kuznets studied the topic of self-referentiality at the logic-level. He dis-
covered theorems of S4, D4, T and K4 that need a self-referential constant
specification to be realized in their justification logic counterparts [12]. Jun-
hua Yu on the other hand studied self-referentiality at the theorem level. He
discovered prehistoric cycles as a necessary condition for self-referential S4 the-
orems [16] and later expanded that results to the modal logics T and K4 [17].
He also conjectured that the condition is actually sufficient for self-referential
S4 theorems. In this paper we will concentrate on that topic, that is prehistoric
cycles as necessary and sufficient condition for self-referential theorems in S4.
This paper is divided in three parts. In the first part we introduce the modal
logic S4 and its justification counterpart LP. The second part restates Yu’s main
theorem, i.e. that prehistoric cycles are a necessary condition for self-referential
theorems in S4. The third part goes beyond Yu’s original paper by adapting
the notion of prehistoric cycles to Gentzen systems with cut rules and finally
to a Gentzen system for LP. This allows to study prehistoric cycles directly in
LP, which leads to the two main results of this paper. First, with the standard
definition of self-referential theorems, prehistoric cycles are not a sufficient con-
dition. Second, with an expansion on the definition of self-referential theorems,
prehistoric cycles become sufficient for self-referential theorems.
2 LP and S4
2.1 Preliminaries
As the results and concepts in this paper are mostly purely syntactical, we
will also limit this brief introduction to the modal logic S4 and its justification
counterpart LP to the syntactic side.
Definition 1 (Syntax of S4). The language of S4 is given by A := ⊥ | P | A0 ∧
A1 | A0 ∨ A1 | A0 → A1 | A | ♦A. By using the known abbreviations for ∧, ∨
and ♦ we can reduce that to the minimal language A := ⊥ | P | A0 → A1 | A.
Definition 2 (Syntax of LP). The language of LP consists of terms given by
t := c | x | t0 · t1 | t0 + t0 | !t and formulas given by A := ⊥ | P | A0 → A1 | t:A.
A Hilbert style system for LP is given by the following Axioms and the rules
modus ponens and axiom necessitation [2]
• A0: Finite set of axiom schemes of classical propositional logic
• A1: t:F → F (Reflection)
• A2: s:(F → G)→ (t:F → (s · t):G) (Application)
• A3: t:F → !t:(t:F ) (Proof Checker)
• A4: s:F → (s+ t):F , t:F → (s+ t):F (Sum)
• R1: F → G,F ⊢ G (Modus Ponens)
• R2: A ⊢ c:A, if A is an axiom A0−A4 and c a constant (Axiom Necessi-
tation)
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A Hilbert style derivation d from a set of assumptions Γ is a sequence of
formulas A0, . . . , An such that any formula is either an instance of an axiom
A0–A4, a formula A ∈ Γ or derived from earlier formulas by a rule R1 or R2.
The notation Γ ⊢LP A means that a LP derivation from assumptions Γ ending
in A exists. We also write ⊢LP A or LP ⊢ A if a LP derivation for A without
any assumptions exists.
When formulating such derivations, we will introduce propositional tautolo-
gies without derivation and use the term propositional reasoning for any use of
modus ponens together with a propositional tautology. This is of course correct
as axioms A0 together with the modus ponens rule R1 are a complete Hilbert
style system for classical propositional logic. Its easy to see by a simple complete
induction on the proof length that this derivations do not use any new terms
not already occurring in the final propositional tautology.
Definition 3 (Constant Specification). A constant specification CS is a set of
of formulas of the form c:A with c a constant and A an axiom A0-A4.
Every LP derivation naturally generates a finite constant specification of all
formulas derived by axiom necessitation (R2). For a given constant specifica-
tion CS, LP(CS) is the logic with axiom necessitation restricted to that CS.
LP0 := LP(∅) is the logic without axiom necessitation. A constant specification
CS is injective if for each constant c there is at most one formula c:A ∈ CS.
2.2 Gentzen Systems
In the following, capital greek letters Γ, ∆ are used for multisets of formu-
las, latin letters P , Q for atomic formulas and latin letters A, B for arbitrary
formulas. We also use the following short forms:
• Γ := {A|A ∈ Γ}
• Γ, A := Γ ∪ {A}
• Γ,∆ := Γ ∪∆
•
∧
Γ := A0 ∧ · · · ∧An and
∨
Γ := A0 ∨ · · · ∨An for the formulas Ai ∈ Γ in
an arbitrary but fixed order.
Throughout this paper, we will use the G3s calculus from Troelstra and
Schwichtenberg [15] for our examples with additional rules (¬ ⊃) and (⊃ ¬) as
we are only concerned with classical logic (see figure 1). For proofs, on the other
hand, we use a minimal subset of that system consisting only of (Ax), (⊥ ⊃),
(→⊃), (⊃→), ( ⊃), and (⊃ ) using the standard derived definitions for ¬,
∨, ∧ and ♦.
In Artemov [2], a Gentzen-Style system LPG is introduced for the logic of
proofs LP using explicit contraction and weakening rules, i.e. based on G1c
as defined in Troelstra and Schwichtenberg [15]. Later we will follow Cornelia
Pulver [14] instead and use G3lp with the structural rules absorbed.
In all rules, arbitrary formulas which occur in the premises and the conclu-
sion (denoted by repeated multisets Γ, Γ, ∆ and ♦∆) are called side formulas.
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Figure 1: Full G3s
P,Γ ⊃ ∆, P (Ax) (P atomic) ⊥,Γ ⊃ ∆ (⊥ ⊃)
Γ ⊃ ∆, A
(¬ ⊃)
¬A,Γ ⊃ ∆
A,Γ ⊃ ∆
(⊃ ¬)
Γ ⊃ ∆,¬A
A,B,Γ ⊃ ∆
(∧ ⊃)
A ∧B,Γ ⊃ ∆
Γ ⊃ ∆, A Γ ⊃ ∆, B
(⊃ ∧)
Γ ⊃ ∆, A ∧B
A,Γ ⊃ ∆ B,Γ ⊃ ∆
(∨ ⊃)
A ∨B,Γ ⊃ ∆
Γ ⊃ ∆, A,B
(⊃ ∨)
Γ ⊃ ∆, A ∨B
Γ ⊃ ∆, A B,Γ ⊃ ∆
(→⊃)
A→ B,Γ ⊃ ∆
A,Γ ⊃ ∆, B
(⊃→)
Γ ⊃ ∆, A→ B
A,A,Γ ⊃ ∆
( ⊃)
A,Γ ⊃ ∆
Γ ⊃ ♦∆, A
(⊃ )
Γ′,Γ ⊃ ♦∆,∆′,A
A,Γ ⊃ ♦∆
(♦ ⊃)
♦A,Γ′,Γ ⊃ ♦∆,∆′
Γ ⊃ ∆, A,♦A
(⊃ ♦)
Γ ⊃ ∆,♦A
Arbitrary formulas which only occur in the conclusion (denoted by new multi-
sets Γ, ∆, Γ′, ∆′) are called weakening formulas.1 The remaining single new
formula in the conclusion is called the principal formula of the rule. The re-
maining formulas in the premises are called active formulas. Active formulas
are always used as subformulas of the principal formula. Active formulas which
are also strict subformulas of other active formulas of the same rule as used in
(:⊃) and ( ⊃) are contraction formulas.
Formally, a Gentzen style proof is denoted by T = (T,R), where T :=
{S0, . . . , Sn} is the set of occurrences of sequents, and
R := {(Si, Sj) ∈ T × T |
Si is the conclusion of a rule which has Sj as a premise}.
The only root sequent of T is denoted by Sr. A leaf sequent S is a sequent
without any premises, i.e S /RS′ for all S′ ∈ T .
A path in a proof tree is a list of related sequent occurrences S0R . . .RSn.
A root path is a path starting at the root sequent Sr. A root-leaf path is a
root path ending in a leaf sequent.2 A root path is fully defined by the last
sequent S. So we will use root path S to mean the unique path SrRS0R . . . RS
from the root Sr to the sequent S. T ↾S denotes the subtree of T with root S.
1Notice that weakening formulas only occur in axioms and the rules (⊃ ) and (♦ ⊃),
which are also the only rules that restrict the possible side formulas.
2Yu uses the term path for a root path and branch for a root-leaf path. As this terminology
is ambiguous we adopted the slightly different terminology given here.
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The transitive closure of R is denoted by R+ and the reflexive-transitive closure
is denoted by R∗.
Consistent with the notation for the Hilbert style system LP, the notation
G ⊢ Γ ⊂ ∆ is used if there exists a Gentzen style proof tree with the sequent
Γ ⊂ ∆ as root in the system G.
Definition 4 (Correspondence). The subformula (symbol) occurrences in a
proof correspond to each other as follows:
• Every subformula (symbol) occurrence in a side formula of a premise di-
rectly corresponds to the same occurrence of that subformula (symbol) in
the same side formula in the conclusion.
• Every active formula of a premise directly correspond to the topmost sub-
formula occurrence of the same formula in the principal formula of the
conclusion.
• Every subformula (symbol) occurrence in an active formula of a premise
directly corresponds to the same occurrence of that subformula (symbol)
in the corresponding subformula in the principal formula of the rule.
• Two subformulas (symbols) correspond to each other by the transitive
reflexive closure of direct correspondence.
As by definition correspondence is reflexive and transitive, we get the fol-
lowing definition for the equivalence classes of correspondence:
Definition 5 (Family). A family is an equivalence class of  occurrences which
respect to correspondence.
For the following lemma and all the other results in this paper concerning
correspondence, we fix a proof tree T = (T,R) and consider correspondence
according to this complete proof tree even when talking about subtrees T ↾S
of T .
As usual, we have the subformula property.
Lemma 6 (Subformula Property). Any subformula (symbol) occurrence in a
partial Gentzen style (pre-)proof T ↾S in G3s corresponds to at least one subfor-
mula (symbol) occurrence of the sequent S of T ↾S.
Any subformula (symbol) occurrence in a complete Gentzen style (pre-)proof T
in G3s corresponds to exactly one subformula (symbol) occurrence in the root
sequent Sr of T .
2.3 Annotated S4
As we have already seen, all symbol occurrences in a Gentzen style proof can be
divided in disjoint equivalence classes of corresponding symbol occurrences. In
this text we will be mainly concerned with the equivalence classes of  occur-
rences, called families, and their polarities as defined below. We will therefore
define annotated formulas, sequents and proof trees in this section which make
the families and polarities of  occurrences explicit in the notation and usable
in definitions.
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Definition 7 (Polarity). Assign positive or negative polarity relative to A to
all subformulas occurrences B in A as follows:
• The only occurrence of A in A has positive polarity.
• If an occurrence B → C in A already has a polarity, then the occurrence
of C in B → C has the same polarity and the occurrence of B in B → C
has the opposite polarity.
• If an occurrence B already has a polarity, then the occurrence of B in
B has the same polarity.
Similarly all occurrences of subformulas in a sequent Γ ⊃ ∆ get assigned a
polarity as follows:
• An occurrence of a subformula B in a formula A in Γ has the opposite
polarity relative to the sequent Γ ⊃ ∆ as the same occurrence B in the
formula A has relative to A.
• An occurrence of a subformula B in a formula A in ∆ has the same polarity
relative to the sequent Γ ⊃ ∆ as the same occurrence B in the formula A
has relative to A.
This gives the subformulas of a sequent Γ ⊃ ∆ the same polarity as they
would have in the equivalent formula
∧
Γ →
∨
∆. Also notice that for the
derived operators all subformulas have the same polarity, except for ¬ which
switches the polarity for its subformula.
The rules of S4 respect the polarities of the subformulas, so that all cor-
responding occurrences of subformulas have the same polarity throughout the
proof. We therefore assign positive polarity to families of positive occurrences
and negative polarity to families of negative occurrences. Moreover, positive
families in a S4 proof which have occurrences introduced by a (⊃ ) rule are
called principal positive families or simply principal families. The remaining
positive families are called non-principal positive families.3
The following definition of an annotated proof as well as the definition of a
realization function are heavily inspired by Fittings use of explicit annotations
in Fitting [8]. Other than Fitting, we allow ourselves to treat symbols ⊞i,
⊟i directly as mathematical objects and define functions on them, instead of
encoding the symbols as natural numbers.
For the following definition, we use an arbitrary fixed enumeration for all
different classes of families. That is, we enumerate all principal positive families
as p0, . . . , pnp , all non-principal positive families as o0, . . . , ono and all negative
families as n0, . . . , nnn . Given a S4 proof T we then annotate the formulas A in
the proof in the following way:
Definition 8 (Annotated Proof). anT (A) is defined recursively on all occur-
rences of subformulas A in a proof T as follows:
• If A is the occurrence of an atomic formula P or ⊥, then anT (A) := A.
3This is the same terminology as used in Yu [16]. In many papers principal families are
called essential families following the original text [2].
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• If A = A0 → A1, then anT (A) := anT (A0)→ anT (A1)
• If A = A0 and the  belongs to a principal positive family pi, then
anT (A) := ⊞i anT (A0).
• If A = A0 and the  belongs to a non-principal positive family oi, then
anT (A) := ⊡i anT (A0).
• If A = A0 and the  belongs to a negative family ni, then anT (A) :=
⊟i anT (A0).
2.4 Realization
LP and S4 are closely related and LP can be understood as an explicit version
of S4. The other way around, S4 can be seen as a version of LP with proof
details removed or forgotten. We will establish this close relationship in this
section formally by two main theorems translating valid LP formulas into valid
S4 formulas and vice versa. The former is called forgetful projection, the latter
is more complex and called realization.
Definition 9 (Forgetful Projection). The forgetful projection A◦ of a LP for-
mula A is the following S4 formula:
• if A is atomic or ⊥, then A◦ := A.
• if A is the formula A0 → A1 then A◦ := A◦0 → A
◦
1
• if A is the formula t:A0 then A
◦ := A0
The definition is expanded to sets, multisets and sequents of LP formulas in
the natural way.
The forgetful projection maps LP theorems to S4 theorems.
Theorem 10. If LP ⊢ A then S4 ⊢ A◦.
In the other direction, one can realize S4 formulas in LP by replacing the
 occurrences by explicit justification terms as defined below. Of course most
of this realizations will not transform a theorem of S4 into a theorem of LP.
So the realization theorem will only assert the existence of a specific realization
producing a theorem of LP from a theorem of S4. The constructive proof for
the realization theorem also provides us with an algorithm to generate one
such realization. However, that realization is not necessarily the only possible
realization or the simplest one.
Definition 11 (Realization Function). A realization function rT for a proof T
is a mapping from the set of different  symbols used in anT (T ) to arbitrary
LP terms.
Definition 12 (LP-Realization). By an LP-realization of a modal formula A
we mean an assignment of proof polynomials to all occurrences of the modality
in A along with a constant specification of all constants occurring in those proof
polynomials. By Ar we understand the image of A under a realization r.
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An LP-realization of A is fully determined by a realization function rT rela-
tive to a proof tree for ⊃ A and a constant specification of all constants occurring
in rT with A
r := rT (anT (A)).
If we read A as there exists a proof for A and t:A as t is a proof for A,
this process seems immediately reasonable. For the formula ¬A, read as there
is no proof of A, and its realization ¬t:A, read as t is not a proof of A, on the
other hand, that process seems wrong at first. But justification logic without
any quantifications over proofs is still enough to capture the meaning of ¬A by
using Skolem’s idea of replacing quantifiers with functions. That is, we realize
¬A using an implicitly all quantified justification variable ¬x:A. The same
example formulated without the derived connective ¬ is x:A→ ⊥. That formula
can be read as function which produces a contradiction from a given proof x
for A.
This last interpretation also hints at the role of complex justification terms
using variables in a realization. They define functions from input proofs named
by the variables to output proofs for different formulas. So a realization
x:A→ t(x):B
of an S4 formula A→ B actually defines a function t(x) producing a proof
for B from a proof x for A. This then is the Skolem style equivalent of the
quantified formula ∃(x)x:A→ ∃(y)y:B which is the direct reading of A→ B
(cf Artemov [3]). This discussion implies that we should replace  with negative
polarity with justification variables, which leads to the following definition of a
normal realization:
Definition 13 (Normal). A realization function is normal if all symbols for
negative families and non-principal positive families are mapped to distinct vari-
ables. A LP-realization is normal if the corresponding realization function is
normal and the CS is injective.
We are now ready to complete the connection between S4 and LP by the fol-
lowing realization theorem giving a constructive way of producing the necessary
proof functions to realize a S4 theorem in LP:
Theorem 14 (Realization). If S4 ⊢ A then LP ⊢ Ar for some normal LP-
realization r.
There are many proofs of the realization theorem available. Artemov [2]
already established it in his original paper on the Logic of Proofs. Fitting [8]
introduces a different proof-theoretic realization method. Adapting his method
to nested sequent systems yields a modular realization theorem that covers many
modal logics [11]. There is also a semantic proof of the realization theorem
available [7] and Fitting [10] develops a general realization method that uses
the model existence theorem. A realization theorem can sometimes be obtained
using a translation from one logic into another [6, 9].
3 Prehistoric Relations in G3s
3.1 Self-referentiality
As already mentioned in the introduction, the formulation of LP allows for
terms t to justify formulas A(t) about themselves. We will see that such self-
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referential justification terms are not only possible, but actually unavoidable for
realizing S4 even at the basic level of justification constants. That is to realize
all S4 theorems in LP, we need self-referential constant specifications defined as
follows:
Definition 15 (Self-Referential Constant Specification). A constant specifica-
tion CS is
• directly self-referential if there is a constant c such that c:A(c) ∈ CS.
• self-referential if there is a subset A ⊆ CS such that
A := {c0:A(c1), . . . , cn−1:A(c0)}.
A constant specification which is not directly self-referential is denoted by CS∗.
Similarly a constant specification which is not self-referential at all is denoted by
CS⊙. So CS∗ and CS⊙ stand for a class of constant specifications and not a single
specific one. Following Yu [16], we use the notation LP(CS⊙) ⊢ A if there exists
any non-self-referential constant specification CS such that LP(CS) ⊢ A. There
does exist a single maximal constant specification CSnds that is not directly
self-referential and for any theorem A we have LP(CS∗) ⊢ A iff LP(CSnds) ⊢ A.
Given that any S4 theorem is realizable in LP with some constant speci-
fication, we can carry over the definition of self-referentiality to S4 with the
following definition:
Definition 16 (Self-Referential Theorem). An S4 theorem A is (directly) self-
referential iff for any LP-realization Ar we have that LP(CS⊙)/⊢Ar (respectively
LP(CS∗)/⊢Ar).
Expanding on a first result for S4 in Brezhnev and Kuznets [5], Kuznets [12]
explores the topic of self-referentiality on the level of individual modal logics
and their justification counterparts. He gives theorems for the modal logics S4,
D4, T, and K4 which can only be realized in their justification logic counterpart
using directly self-referential constant specifications, i.e. directly self-referential
theorems by the above definition. So for S4 in particular, Kuznets gives the
theorem ¬¬(S → S) and shows that it is directly self-referential.
We will not reproduce this result but use the logically equivalent formula
¬(P ∧ ¬P ) as an example for a self-referential S4 theorem. Notice that it
does not directly follow from the above theorem that ¬(P ∧ ¬P ) can only
be realized with a self-referential constant specification, as justification terms
do not necessary apply to logically equivalent formulas. Still it should be fairly
straightforward to show that ¬(P ∧ ¬P ) is self-referential by translating
justification terms for the outer  occurrences in the formulas ¬(P ∧ ¬P )
and ¬¬(S → S) using the logical equivalence of P ∧ ¬P and ¬(S → S).
Looking at the G3s proof for ¬(P ∧ ¬P ) and a realization of that proof
in figure 2, we can see why a self referential term like t for the propositional
tautology P ∧ ¬t · x:P → P is necessary. In order to prove ¬(P ∧ ¬P ) one
needs to disprove P ∧ ¬P at some point which means one has to prove P .
The only way to prove P is using (P ∧ ¬P ) as an assumption on the left.
This leads to the situation that the proof introduces  by a (⊃ ) rule where
the same family already occurs on the left. In the following, we will see that
such a situation is actually necessary for the self-referentiality of any S4 formula.
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Figure 2: proof for ¬(P ∧ ¬P ) and its realization
P,¬P,(P ∧ ¬P ) ⊃ P
(∧ ⊃)
P ∧ ¬P,(P ∧ ¬P ) ⊃ P
( ⊃)
(P ∧ ¬P ) ⊃ P
(⊃ )
P,(P ∧ ¬P ) ⊃ P
(¬ ⊃)
P,¬P,(P ∧ ¬P ) ⊃
(∧ ⊃)
P ∧ ¬P,(P ∧ ¬P ) ⊃
( ⊃)
(P ∧ ¬P ) ⊃
(⊃ ¬)
⊃ ¬(P ∧ ¬P )
P,¬t · x:P, x:(P ∧ ¬t · x:P ) ⊃ P
P ∧ ¬t · x:P, x:(P ∧ ¬t · x:P ) ⊃ P
x:(P ∧ ¬t · x:P ) ⊃ P
P, x:(P ∧ ¬t · x:P ) ⊃ t · x:P
P,¬t · x:P, x:(P ∧ ¬t · x:P ) ⊃
P ∧ ¬t · x:P, x:(P ∧ ¬t · x:P ) ⊃
x:(P ∧ ¬t · x:P ) ⊃
⊃ ¬x:(P ∧ ¬t · x:P )
3.2 Prehistoric Relations
In his paper “Prehistoric Phenomena and Self-referentiality” [16], Yu gives a
formal definition for the situation described in the last section, which he calls a
prehistoric loop. In the later paper [18], Yu adopts the proper graph theoretic
term cycle as we do here. Beside that change we will reproduce his definitions
of prehistoric relation, prehistoric cycle as well as some basic lemmas about this
new notions exactly as they were presented in the original paper.
To work with the (⊃ ) rules introducing occurrences of principal families
in a G3s proof, we will use the following notation: we enumerate all (⊃ ) rules
introducing an occurrence of the principal family pi as Ri,0, . . . Ri,li−1 and use
Ii,0, . . . Ii,li−1 to denote the premises of those rules and Oi,0, . . . Oi,li−1 to denote
their conclusions, see Yu [16]
Definition 17 (History). In a root-leaf path S of the form SrR
∗Oi,jRIi,jR
∗S
in a G3s-proof T , the path SrR
∗Oi,j is called a history of the family pi in the
root-leaf path S. The path Ii,jR
∗S is called a pre-history of pi in the root-leaf
path S.
So intuitively every (⊃ ) rule divides a root-leaf path of the proof tree into
two parts. The first part from the root of the tree to the conclusion of the (⊃ )
rule of sequents having a copy of that  symbol, i.e. the history of that  symbol
from its formation up to the root sequent. And the second part which predates
the formation of that  symbol, i.e. all sequents from the leaf up to the premise
of that (⊃ ) rule, which do not have a copy of that symbol. The informal
notion of “having a copy of that symbol” is not the same as correspondence, as
it is not transitively closed. It is possible to have corresponding ⊞i occurrences
of a family pi in a prehistory of that same family. The proof in figure 2 of our
example theorem exhibits this case.
As we are especially interested in these cases, that is occurrences of principal
families in prehistoric periods, the following definition and lemma give that
concept a precise meaning and notation:
Definition 18 (Prehistoric Relation). For any principal positive families pi
and ph and any root-leaf path S of the form SrR
∗Oi,jRIi,jR ∗ S in a S4 proof
T = (T,R):
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(1) If anT (Ii,j) has the form ⊟k0Bk0 , . . . ,⊟kBk(⊞hC), . . . ,⊟kqBkq ⊃ A, then
ph is a left prehistoric family of pi in S with notation h ≺SL i.
(2) If anT (Ii,j) has the form ⊟k0Bk0 , . . . ,⊟kqBkq ⊃ A(⊞hC) then ph is a right
prehistoric family of pi in S with notation h ≺SR i.
(3) The relation of prehistoric family in S is defined by: ≺S :=≺SL ∪ ≺
S
R. The
relation of (left, right) prehistoric family in T is defined by:
≺L:=
⋃
{≺SL | S is a leaf} ≺R:=
⋃
{≺SR | S is a leaf}
and ≺:=≺L ∪ ≺R.
Even though both definitions so far use the notion of a prehistory, they do
not directly refer to each other. But the following lemma provides the missing
connection between these two definitions and therefore explains the common
terminology:
Lemma 19. There is an occurrence of ⊞h in a pre-history of pi in the root-leaf
path S iff h ≺S i.
Proof. (⇒): ⊞h occurs in a sequent S′ in a pre-history of pi in the root-leaf
path S, so S has the form SrR
∗Oi,jRIi,jR
∗S′R∗S for some j < li. By the
subformula property, there is an occurrence of ⊞h in Ii,j as S
′ is part of T ↾Ii,j .
If this occurrence is on the left we have h ≺SL i, if it is on right we have h ≺
S
R i.
In both cases h ≺S i holds.
(⇐): By definition there is a Ii,j in S, where ⊞h occurs either on the left
(for h ≺SL i) or on the right (for h ≺
S
R i). Ii,j is part of the pre-history of Ri,j
in S. 
Having introduced the concepts of prehistoric periods and prehistoric rela-
tions, we are now ready to define the concept of prehistoric cycles used in Yu’s
theorem:
Definition 20 (Prehistoric Cycle). In a G3s-proof T , the ordered list of prin-
cipal positive families pi0 , . . . , pin−1 with length n is called a prehistoric cycle
or left prehistoric cycle respectively, if we have: i0 ≺ i2 ≺ · · · ≺ in−1 ≺ i0 or
i0 ≺L i2 ≺L · · · ≺L in−1 ≺L i0.
In our example formula, we have a prehistoric cycle consisting of a single
principal family which has a left prehistoric relation to itself. The following
lemma shows that if a proof has a prehistoric cycle, then it also has a left
prehistoric cycle:
Lemma 21. T has a prehistoric cycle iff T has a left prehistoric cycle.
Finally, Yu [16] showed that left prehistoric cycles are necessary for self-
referentiality
Theorem 22 (Necessity of Left Prehistoric Cycle for Self-referentiality). If a
S4-theorem A has a left-prehistoric-cycle-free G3s-proof, then there is a LP-
formula B s.t. B◦ = A and LP(CS⊙) ⊢ B
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4 Prehistoric Relations in G3lp
4.1 Cut Rules
In this section we will prepare our discussion of prehistoric relations for LP, by
first expanding the notion of families and prehistoric relations to the systems
G3s + (Cut) and G3s + (Cut) using cut rules. The (context sharing) cut rule
has the following definition:
Definition 23 ((Cut) Rule).
Γ ⊃ ∆, A A,Γ ⊃ ∆
(Cut)
Γ ⊃ ∆
It is necessary to expand the definition of correspondence (def. 4) to (Cut)
rules as follows:
Definition 24 (Correspondence for (Cut)). The active formulas (and their
symbols) in the premises of a (Cut) rule correspond to each other.
The classification and annotations for families of  do not carry over to
G3s + (Cut), as the (Cut) rule uses the cut formula in different polarities
for the two premises. We therefore will consider all  families for prehistoric
relations in G3s + (Cut) proofs. This leads to the following expanded definition
of prehistoric relation:
Definition 25 (Local Prehistoric Relation in G3s + (Cut)). A family i has
a prehistoric relation to another family j, in notation i ≺ j, if there is a
(⊃ ) rule introducing an occurrence of j with premise S, such that there is
an occurrence of i in S.
Notice that there can be prehistoric relations with  families which locally
have negative polarity, as the family could be part of a cut formula and there-
fore also occur with positive polarity in the other branch of the cut. On the
other hand, adding prehistoric relations with negative families in a cut free G3s
proof does not introduce prehistoric cycles, as in G3s a negative family is never
introduced by a (⊃ ) rule and therefore has no prehistoric families itself. In
G3s + (Cut) proofs, the subformula property and therefore also lemma 19 no
longer hold. That means we can have an occurrence of a family  as part of a
cut formula in the global prehistory of a (⊃ ) rule, which by the local definition
is not a local prehistoric family.
To handle terms s · t in the next section an additional rule for modus ponens
under  is necessary. We therefore introduce here the new rule (Cut) as
follows:
Definition 26 ((Cut) Rule).
Γ ⊃ ∆,A,B Γ ⊃ ∆,(A→ B),B
(Cut)
Γ ⊃ ∆,B
Again it is also necessary to expand the definition of correspondence (def. 4)
for this rule:
Definition 27 (Correspondence for (Cut)).
• The topmost  occurrence in the active formulas and the principal formula
correspond to each other.
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• The subformulas A in the active formulas of the premises correspond to
each other.
• The subformulas B correspond to each other.
Notice that with this expansion  occurrences of the same family no longer
are always part of the same subformula C. Also similar to the (Cut) rule,
correspondence is expanded to relate negative and positive occurrences of 
symbols as A is used with different polarities in the two premises.
With the following lemmas and theorems we will establish a constructive
proof for
G3s+(Cut) ⊢ Γ ⊃ ∆⇒ G3s+(Cut) ⊢ Γ ⊃ ∆⇒ G3s ⊢ Γ ⊃ ∆.
Moreover there will be corollaries showing that the constructions do not intro-
duce prehistoric cycles by the new definition 25. As all prehistoric relations
by the first definition 18 are included in the new definition, the final proof
in G3s will be prehistoric-cycle-free by any definition if the original proof in
G3s +(Cut) was prehistoric-cycle-free by the new definition.
We need the following standard result, which we mention without proof.
Lemma 28. Weaking, inversion, and contraction are admissible in G3s. More-
over, for any annotation the constructed proofs do not introduce any new pre-
historic relations.
It is important to note, that the second part of the lemma is not restricted
to the annotations anT of the proofs T = (T,R) given by the premise of the
lemma but still hold for arbitrary annotations an. That means there is no
implicit assumption that the families have only a single occurrence in the root
sequents used in the lemma or theorem and the results can also be used in
subtrees T ↾S together with an annotation anT for the complete tree.
In the case for weakening, the second part of the lemma also follows from the
fact 2.8 in Yu [18]. There, Yu looks at prehistoric relations locally, i.e. taking
only correspondence up to the current sequent in consideration. That means the
graph of prehistoric relations has to be updated going up the proof tree as new
rules add new correspondences and therefore unify vertices in the prehistoric
relations graph which were still separate in the premise. To work with such
changing graphs, Yu introduces the notion of isolated families. He shows that
all  occurrences introduced by weakening are isolated. That means they have
no prehistoric relations themselves, which globally means that they can not add
any prehistoric relations from adding correspondences later in the proof. This
is exactly what the second part asserts for weakening.
Theorem 29 (Cut Elimination for G3s). If
G3s ⊢ Γ ⊃ ∆, A and G3s ⊢ A,Γ ⊃ ∆,
then G3s ⊢ Γ ⊃ ∆.
Proof. By a simultaneous induction over the depths of the proof trees TL for
Γ ⊃ ∆, A and TR for A,Γ ⊃ ∆ as well as the rank of A.
For us, the only interesting case is:
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A is a side formula in the last rule of TR, which is a (⊃ ) rule and a principal
formula in the last rule of TL. Then A has the form A0 as it is a side formula
of a (⊃ ) on the right. So the last rule of TL is also a (⊃ ) rule and the proof
has the following form:
TL
ΓL ⊃ A0 (⊃ )
Γ′L,ΓL ⊃ ∆
′,B,A0
TR
A0,ΓR ⊃ B
(⊃ )
Γ′R,A0,ΓR ⊃ ∆
′,B
(Cut)
Γ ⊃ ∆′,B
where ∆ = ∆′,B and Γ = Γ′L,ΓL = Γ
′
R,ΓR.
The cut can be moved up on the right using weakening as follows:
TL
ΓL ⊃ A0 (⊃ )
ΓR,ΓL ⊃ B,A0
T ′R
A0,ΓR,ΓL ⊃ B
(Cut)
ΓR,ΓL ⊃ B
(⊃ )
Γ,ΓR,ΓL ⊃ ∆
′,B
By the induction hypothesis and a contraction we get the required proof for
Γ ⊃ ∆ as ΓL ⊆ Γ and ΓR ⊆ Γ. 
Corollary 30. For any annotation an the constructed proof for Γ ⊃ ∆ only
introduces new prehistoric relations i ≺ j between families i and j occurring
in Γ ⊃ ∆ where there exists a family k in A such that i ≺ k ≺ j in the original
proof.
Proof. The only place where new prehistoric relations get introduced is by the
new (⊃ ) in the case shown above. All prehistoric relations from ΓR are
already present from the (⊃ ) rule on the right in the original proof. So only
prehistoric relations from ΓL are new. For all families i in ΓL we have
i ≺ k for the family k in the cut formula introduced by the (⊃ ) rule on the
left. Moreover k ≺ j for the same family because of the occurrence of A0 on
the right. 
Corollary 31. For any annotation an the constructed proof for Γ ⊃ ∆ does not
introduce prehistoric cycles.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that there exists a prehistoric cycle
i0 ≺ · · · ≺ in−1 ≺ i0
in the new proof. By the previous lemma for any prehistoric relation
ik ≺ ik+1 mod n
in the cycle either ik ≺ ik+1 mod n in the original proof or there is a family i′k in
the cut formula such that ik ≺ i′k ≺ ik+1 mod n in the original proof. Therefore
we also have a prehistoric cycle in the original proof. 
Theorem 32 ((Cut) Elimination). If
G3s ⊢ Γ ⊃ ∆,A,B and G3s ⊢ Γ ⊃ ∆,(A→ B),B,
then G3s ⊢ Γ ⊃ ∆,B
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Proof. By a structural induction over the proof trees TL for Γ ⊃ ∆,A,B
and TR for Γ ⊃ ∆,(A→ B),B.
1. case: (A → B) or A is a weakening formula of the last rule. Then
removing them from that proof gives the required proof. This includes the case
when B is the principal formula of the last rule of either proof, as then the
last rule is (⊃ ) which has no side formulas on the right.
2. case: (A → B) or A is a side formula of the last rule. Then also B
is a side formula of that rule. Use the induction hypothesis on the premises of
that rule with the other proof and append the same rule.
3. case: (A→ B) and A are the principal formula of the last rule. Then
the last rules have the following form:
TL
ΓL ⊃ A (⊃ )
Γ′L,ΓL ⊃ ∆,A,B
TR
ΓR ⊃ A→ B (⊃ )
Γ′R,ΓR ⊃ ∆,(A→ B),B (Cut)
Γ ⊃ ∆,B
where ∆ = ∆′,B and Γ = Γ′L,ΓL = Γ
′
R,ΓR.
By inversion for (⊃→) we get a proof T ′R for A,ΓR ⊃ B from the first
premise ΓR ⊃ A → B. Using weakening and a normal cut on the formula A
we get the following proof:
T ′L
ΓL,ΓR ⊃ A
T ′′R
A,ΓL,ΓR ⊃ B
(Cut)
ΓL,ΓR ⊃ B
(⊃ )
Γ,ΓL,ΓR ⊃ ∆,B
By contraction and a cut elimination we get the required G3s proof for
Γ ⊃ ∆,B as ΓL ⊆ Γ and ΓR ⊆ Γ. 
Corollary 33. For any annotation an the constructed proof for Γ ⊃ ∆,B
does not introduce prehistoric cycles.
Proof. Removing weakening or side formulas (A → B) or A as in case 1
and 2 does not introduce new prehistoric relations.
Any prehistoric relation because of the new (⊃ ) rule in case 3 already
exists in the original proof, as every  occurrence in ΓL or ΓR also occurs
in one of the two (⊃ ) rules in the original proof, which both introduce a  of
the same family as B by the definition of correspondence for (Cut).
So the new proof with (Cut) rules replaced by (Cut) rules does not intro-
duce new prehistoric relations and therefore also no new prehistoric cycles. By
corollary 31, the cut elimination to get a G3s proof does not introduce prehis-
toric cycles. 
Definition 34. The cycle-free fragment of a system Y , denoted by Y ⊗, is the
collection of all sequents that each have a prehistoric-cycle-free Y -proof.
Theorem 35. The cycle-free fragments of G3s + (Cut), G3s + (Cut) and
G3s are identical.
Proof. A prehistoric-cycle-free proof in G3s by the original definition 18 is also
prehistoric-cycle-free by the new definition 25 as a negative family can not have
any prehistoric families itself in a G3s-proof . So any sequent
Γ ⊂ ∆ ∈ G3s⊗
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is trivially also provable prehistoric-cycle-free in G3s + (Cut) and G3s + (Cut)
and we have G3s⊗ ⊆ (G3s+(Cut))⊗ and G3s⊗ ⊆ (G3s+(Cut))⊗. Moreover
(G3s+(Cut))⊗ ⊆ G3s⊗ by corollary 31 and
(G3s+(Cut))⊗ ⊆ (G3s+(Cut))⊗ ⊆ G3s⊗
by corollary 33. All together we get
G3s⊗ = (G3s+(Cut))⊗ = (G3s+(Cut))⊗ 
Yu [18, th. 2.21] shows that non-self-referentiality is not normal in T, K4,
and S4. The results in this section hint at an explanation for this fact for S4
and at the possibility to still use modus ponens with further restrictions in the
non-self-referential subset of S4. Namely, to consider the global aspects of self-
referentiality coming from correspondence of occurrences, it is necessary when
combining two proofs, that the two proofs together with the correct correspon-
dences added are prehistoric-cycle-free. So we can only use modus ponens on
two non-self-referential S4 theorems A and A→ B if there are proofs of A and
A → B such that the prehistoric relations of these proofs combined, together
with identifying the occurrences of A in both proofs, are prehistoric-cycle-free.
In that case we get a prehistoric-cycle-free G3s proof for B using cut elimination
and corollary 30, which shows that B is also non-self-referential.
4.2 A sufficient condition for self-referentiality
Cornelia Pulver [14] introduces the system LPG3 by expanding G3c with rules
for the build up of justification terms as well as the new axioms (Axc) and (Axt).
To ensure that the contraction lemma holds, all rules have to be invertible, which
is the reason why contracting variants of all the justification rules are used for
LPG3. Our variant G3lp will use the same rules to build up terms, but replace
the axioms with rules (⊃:)c and (⊃:)t to keep the prehistoric relations of the
proof intact. As there is a proof for ⊃ A for any axiom A and also for A ⊃ A for
any formula A, these two rules are equivalent to the two axioms and invertible.
As we already did with G3s, we will use the full system with all classical
operators for examples, but only the minimal subset with → and ⊥ for proofs.
So these two systems use the classical rules from G3s as well as the new LP
rules in figure 3.
Figure 3: G3lp
⊃ A
(⊃:)c (A an axiom of LP)
Γ ⊃ ∆, c:A
t:A ⊃ A
(⊃:)t
t:A,Γ ⊃ ∆, t:A
A, t:A,Γ ⊃ ∆
(: ⊃)
t:A,Γ ⊃ ∆
Γ ⊃ ∆, t:A, !t:t:A
(⊃!)
Γ ⊃ ∆, !t:t:A
Γ ⊃ ∆, s:A, t:A, (s+ t):A
(⊃ +)
Γ ⊃ ∆, (s+ t):A
Γ ⊃ ∆, s:(A→ B), s · t:B Γ ⊃ ∆, t:A, s · t:B
(⊃ ·)
Γ ⊃ ∆, s · t:B
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This system is adequate for the logic of proofs LP as shown in corollary 4.37
in Pulver [14]. It also allows for weakening, contraction and inversion. By corol-
lary 4.36 in the same paper, G3lp without the (⊃:)c rule is equivalent to LP0.
Neither Pulver [14] nor Artemov [2] define Gentzen systems for a restricted logic
of proofs LP(CS), perhaps because it seems obvious that restricting whatever
rule is used for introducing proof constants to CS gives a Gentzen system for
LP(CS).
To work with prehistoric relations in G3lp proofs we need the following new
or adapted definitions:
Definition 36 (Subformula). The set of subformulas sub(A) of a LP formula
A is inductively defined as follows:
1. sub(P ) = {P} for any atomic formula P
2. sub(⊥) = {⊥}
3. sub(A0 → A1) = sub(A0) ∪ sub(A1) ∪ {A0 → A1}
4. sub(s+ t:A0) = sub(A0) ∪ {s:A0, t:A0, s+ t:A0}
5. sub(t:A0) = sub(A0) ∪ {t:A0}
Definition 37 (Subterm). The set of subterms sub(t) of a LP justification term
t is inductively defined as follows:
1. sub(x) = {x} for any variable x
2. sub(c) = {c} for any constant c
3. sub(!t) = sub(t) ∪ {!t}
4. sub(s+ t) = sub(s) ∪ sub(t) ∪ {s+ t}
5. sub(s · t) = sub(s) ∪ sub(t) ∪ {s · t}
The set of subterms sub(A) of a LP formula A is the union of all sets of
subterms for all terms occurring in A.
We use the symbol sub for all definitions of subterms and subformulas, as it
will be clear from context which of the definitions is meant. Notice that by this
definition s:A is a subformula of s+ t:A.
We expand the definition of correspondence to G3lp proofs as follows:
Definition 38 (Correspondence in G3lp). All topmost terms in active or prin-
cipal formulas in the rules (⊃ ·), (⊃ +) (⊃!) and (: ⊃) correspond to each
other.
Notice that in the (⊃!) rule, the topmost term t in the contraction formula
therefore corresponds to the topmost proof term !t in the principal formula. The
term t of the other active formula !t:t:A on the other hand corresponds to the
same term t in the principal formula.
By this definition, families of terms in G3lp consist not of occurrences of a
single term t but of occurrences of subterms s of a top level term t. We will use t¯
for the family of occurrences corresponding to the top level term t, i.e. seen as
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a set of terms instead of term occurrences we have t¯ ⊆ sub(t). So for any term
occurrence s, s¯ is not necessarily the full family of s in the complete proof tree as
s could be a subterm of the top level term t of the family. For any occurrence s
in a sequent S of the proof tree though, s¯ is the family of s relative to the
subtree T ↾S as all related terms in the premises of G3lp rules are subterms of
the related term in the conclusion.
We also see that most rules of G3lp only relate terms to each other used for
the same subformula A. The two exceptions are the (⊃ ·) rule and the (⊃!) rule.
Similar to the cut rules from the previous section, (⊃ ·) relates subformulas and
symbols of different polarities as well as terms used for different formulas. So
we will use the same approach to define prehistoric relations of term families for
any polarity:
Definition 39 (Prehistoric Relation in G3lp). A family t¯i has a prehistoric
relation to another family t¯j , in notation i ≺ j, if there is a (⊃:) rule introducing
an occurrence belonging to t¯j with premise S, such that there is an occurrence
belonging to t¯i in S.
Given that we now have defined families of terms and prehistoric relations
between them in G3lp, it is interesting to see what happens with this relations
if we look at the forgetful projection of a G3lp proof. That is, what happens
on the G3s side if we construct a proof tree with the forgetful projections of
the original sequents. Of course we do not get a pure G3s proof as most of the
G3lp rules have no direct equivalent in G3s. We will therefore define new rules,
which are the forgetful projection of a G3lp rule denoted for example by (⊃!)◦
for the forgetful projection of a (⊃!) rule. The following two lemmas show that
all this new rules are admissible in G3s + (Cut).
Lemma 40. G3lp ⊢ Γ ⊃ ∆,A iff G3lp ⊢ Γ ⊃ ∆,A.
Proof. The (⇐) direction is just inversion for (⊃ ). The (⇒) direction is
proven by the following structural induction:
1. case: A is a weakening formula of the last rule. Just weaken in A.
2. case: A is a side formula of the last rule. Use the induction hypothesis
on the premises and append the same last rule.
3. case: A is the principal formula of the last rule. Then the last rule is a
(⊃ ) rule and has the following form:
Γ ⊃ A
(⊃ )
Γ′,Γ ⊃ ∆,A
Use an additional (⊃ ) rule to get the necessary proof as follows:
Γ ⊃ A
(⊃ )
Γ ⊃ A
(⊃ )
Γ′,Γ ⊃ ∆,A

Lemma 41. The forgetful projection of all rules in G3lp are admissible in G3s
+ (Cut).
Proof. The subset G3c is shared by G3lp and G3s and is therefore trivially
admissible. The forgetful projection of the rule (⊃ +) is just a contraction and
therefore also admissible. The forgetful projection of the rules (⊃:)t and (⊃:)c
are (⊃ ) rules in G3s. The forgetful projection of (⊃ ·) is a (Cut). Finally
the forgetful projection of a (⊃!) rule has the following form:
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Γ ⊃ ∆,A,A
(⊃!)◦
Γ ⊃ ∆,A
That rule is admissible by lemma 40 and a contraction. 
Instead of working with a G3s system with all this extra rules included, we
will define a forgetful projection from a G3lp proof to a G3s + (Cut) proof by
eliminating all contractions using the algorithm implicitly defined in the proof
of contraction admissibility and eliminating the (⊃!)◦ rules by the algorithm
implicitly described in the proof for lemma 40.
For the following lemmas and proofs we fix an arbitrary G3lp proof T =
(T,R) and its forgetful projection T ◦ = (T ′, R′) as defined below.
Definition 42 (Forgetful Projection of a G3lp Proof). The forgetful projection
of a G3lp proof T = (T,R) for a LP sequent Γ ⊃ ∆ is the G3s + (Cut) proof
T ◦ = (T ′, R′) for Γ◦ ⊃ ∆◦ inductively defined as follows:
1. case: The last rule of T is an axiom. Then T ◦ is just Γ◦ ⊃ ∆◦ which is
an axiom of G3s.
2. case: The last rule of T is a (⊃→) or a (→⊃) rule with premises Si. Then
T ◦ has the same last rule with (T ↾Si)◦ as proofs for the premises S◦i .
3. case: The last rule of T is a (⊃:)c or (⊃:)t rule with premise S. Then T ◦
has a (⊃ ) as last rule with (T ↾S)◦ as proof for the premise S◦.
4. case: The last rule of T is a (⊃ +) rule with premise S. Then T ◦ is
(T ↾S)◦ with the necessary contraction applied.
5. case: The last rule of T is a (⊃ ·) rule with premises S0 and S1. Then
T ◦ has a (Cut) as last rule with (T ↾Si)◦ as proofs for the premises S◦i .
6. case: The last rule of T is a (⊃!) rule with premise S. Then we get a G3s
+ (Cut) proof for Γ◦ ⊃ ∆◦,A from the proof (T ↾S)◦ by lemma 40. T ◦ is
that proof with the additional A removed by contraction as A ∈ ∆◦.
To reason about the relations between a G3lp proof T and its forgetful
projection T ◦, the following algorithm to construct T ◦ is useful:
1. Replace all sequents by their forgetful projection.
2. Add the additional (⊃ ) rules and prepend additional  where necessary,
so that the forgetful projections of (⊃!) reduce to simple contractions.
3. Eliminate all contractions to get a G3s + (Cut) proof.
It is not immediately clear that contracting formulas only removes occur-
rences as the proof uses inversion which in turn also adds weakening formulas.
But all the deconstructed parts weakened in this way get contracted again in
the next step of the contraction. In the end the contracted proof tree is always
a subset of the original proof tree.
That means that also T ◦ is a subset of the tree constructed in step 2 of the
algorithm. From this we see that all  occurrences in T ◦ have a term occurrence
in T mapped to them if we consider the extra  occurrences introduced in
step 2 (resp. in case 6 of the definition) as replacements of the same term as
the  occurrences they are contracted with and also consider the extra sequents
Γ ⊃ A introduced in step 2 as copies of the same formulas in the original
sequent Γ′,Γ ⊃ ∆,A derived by the original (⊃ ) rule.
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Lemma 43. For any family fi of  occurrences in T ◦ there is a unique proof
term family t¯˜i in T such that s ∈ t¯˜i for all proof term occurrences s mapped to
 occurrences in fi.
Proof. For any two directly corresponding  occurrences we show that the two
mapped term occurrences correspond directly or by reflexive closure:
1. case: The two  occurrences are added in step 2 of the algorithm. Then
the mapped term occurrences are the same occurrence and correspond by re-
flexive closure.
2. case: The two  occurrence correspond directly by a rule which is the
forgetful projection of a rule in T . Then the mapped term occurrences also
correspond as all G3lp rules with a direct equivalent in G3s have the same
correspondences. Notice that lemma 40 only removes weakening formulas from
existing (⊃ ) rules. So this still holds for (⊃ ) rules and their corresponding
(⊃:) rules even after applying lemma 40.
3. case: The two  occurrences correspond directly by a (⊃ ) rule added
in step 2 of the algorithm. Then the rule together with the previous rule has
the following form:
Γ ⊃ A
(⊃ )
Γ ⊃ A
(⊃ )
Γ′,Γ ⊃ ∆,A
As the formulas in Γ ⊃ A are considered copies of the original sequent
Γ′,Γ ⊃ ∆,A, and the sequent Γ′,Γ ⊃ ∆,A is considered the same
sequent with an additional  symbol, the mapped term occurrences are actually
the same and therefore correspond by reflexive closure.
As direct correspondence in the G3s proof is a subset of correspondence
in the G3lp proof, so is its transitive and reflexive closure. So for any two
corresponding  occurrences of a family fi the mapped term occurrences also
correspond and therefore belong to the same family t¯˜i. 
Lemma 44. If i ≺ j in T ◦ then either i˜ = j˜ or i˜ ≺ j˜ in T for the term families
t¯˜i and t¯j˜ from the previous lemma.
Proof. i ≺ j in T ◦, so there is a (⊃ ) rule in T ◦ introducing an occurrence
j of fj with an occurrence i of fi in the premise. For the mapped term
occurrences si and sj in T we have si ∈ t¯˜i and sj ∈ t¯j˜ by the previous lemma.
From this it follows that i˜ ≺ j˜ or i˜ = j˜ by an induction on the proof height:
1. case: The (⊃ ) rule is the forgetful projection of a (⊃:) rule. Then we
have i˜ ≺ j˜ directly by the definition of prehistoric relations for G3lp proofs using
the occurrences si in the premise of the rule (⊃:) introducing the occurrence sj .
2. case: The (⊃ ) rule is added in step 2 of the algorithm. Then the rule
together with the previous rule has the following form:
Γ ⊃ A
(⊃ )
Γ ⊃ kA (⊃ )
Γ′,Γ ⊃ ∆,jkA
For the term occurrence sk mapped to the occurrence k we have sj =!sk
and sk ∈ t¯j˜ as sj is the top level term of the principal formula of a (⊃!) rule. If
the occurrence i is the occurrence k then i˜ = j˜ and we are finished. If the
occurrence i is not the occurrence k then there is a corresponding occurrence
′i with a corresponding mapped term s
′
i in the sequent Γ ⊃ A and we have
i ≺ k from the previous (⊃ ). As t¯j˜ is also the term family of sk we get i˜ ≺ j˜
20
or i˜ = j˜ by induction hypothesis on the shorter proof up to the that (⊃ ) rule
with the occurrences ′i, s
′
i, k and sk. 
Corollary 45. If T is prehistoric-cycle-free then also T ◦ is prehistoric-cycle-
free.
Proof. The contraposition follows directly from the lemma as for any cycle
i0 ≺ · · · ≺ in ≺ i0 in T
◦
we get a cycle in T by removing duplicates in the list i˜0, . . . , i˜n of mapped term
families t¯˜i0 , . . . t¯˜in . 
We will now come back to our example formula ¬(P ∧ ¬P ) from sec-
tion 3.1. Figure 4 contains a proof of the same realization ¬x:(P ∧ ¬t · x:P )
in G3lp as well as the forgetful projection of that proof in G3s + (Cut). For
simplicity we assumed that (A ∧ B → A) is an axiom A0 and therefore t is a
constant.
This proofs display the logical dependencies that make the formula self-
referential in quite a different way than the original G3s proof in figure 2. There
are three families of  in the G3s + (Cut) proof. Two are the same families
as in the G3s proof, occur in the root sequent and have a consistent polarity
throughout the proof. We therefore simply use the symbols ⊞ and ⊟ for this
families. The third one is part of the cut formula and therefore does not occur
in the final sequent and does not have consistent polarity throughout the proof.
We use  for occurrences of this family in the proof.
All left prehistoric relations of the proof are from left branch of the cut where
we have ⊟ ≺L ⊞ and the cycle ⊞ ≺L ⊞. Other than in the G3s proof, the two ⊞
occurrences are used for different formulas P and P ∧¬P and the connection
between the two is established by the (Cut) with (P ∧¬P → P ). A similar
situation is necessary for any prehistoric cycle in a G3lp proof as we will show
formally.
Lemma 46. All occurrences belonging to a term family t¯ in a premise S of any
(⊃:) rule are occurrences of the top level term t itself.
Proof. All G3lp rules only relate different terms if they are top level terms on
the right. All occurrences of s ∈ t¯ in a premise S of a (⊃:) rule correspond either
as part of a strict subformula on the right or as part of a subformula on the left
of the conclusion. A formula on the left can only correspond to a subformula on
the right as a strict subformula. Therefore all corresponding occurrences of s
on the right in the remaining path up to the root are part of a strict subformula
and so all corresponding occurrences of s, left or right, in the remaining path
are occurrences of the same term s. As t itself is a corresponding occurrence of
s in that path, we get t = s. 
Corollary 47. If i ≺ j for two term families t¯i and t¯j of a G3lp proof, then
there is (⊃:) rule introducing an occurrence s ∈ t¯j in a formula s:A such that
there is an occurrence of ti in s:A (as a term, not as a family, i.e. the occurrence
of ti is not necessary in t¯i).
Proof. Follows directly from the lemma and the definition of prehistoric relations
for G3lp. 
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Figure 4: G3lp proof
P,¬t · x:P, x:(P ∧ ¬t · x:P ) ⊃ P
P, t · x:P ⊃ P
(:⊃)
t · x:P ⊃ P
(⊃:)t
P, t · x:P, x:(P ∧ ¬t · x:P ) ⊃ t · x:P
(⊃ ¬)
P, x:(P ∧ ¬t · x:P ) ⊃ t · x:P,¬t · x:P
(¬ ⊃)
P,¬t · x:P, x:(P ∧ ¬t · x:P ) ⊃ ¬t · x:P
(⊃ ∧)
P,¬t · x:P, x:(P ∧ ¬t · x:P ) ⊃ P ∧ ¬t · x:P
(∧ ⊃)
P ∧ ¬t · x:P, x:(P ∧ ¬t · x:P ) ⊃ P ∧ ¬t · x:P
(:⊃)
x:(P ∧ ¬t · x:P ) ⊃ P ∧ ¬t · x:P
(⊃:)t
P, x:(P ∧ ¬t · x:P ) ⊃ x:(P ∧ ¬t · x:P ), t · x:P
P,¬t · x:P ⊃ P
(∧ ⊃)
P ∧ ¬t · x:P ⊃ P
(⊃→)
⊃ P ∧ ¬t · x:P → P
(⊃:)c
P, x:(P ∧ ¬t · x:P ) ⊃ t:(P ∧ ¬t · x:P → P ), t · x:P
(⊃ ·)
P, x:(P ∧ ¬t · x:P ) ⊃ t · x:P
(¬ ⊃)
P,¬t · x:P, x:(P ∧ ¬t · x:P ) ⊃
(∧ ⊃)
P ∧ ¬t · x:P, x:(P ∧ ¬t · x:P ) ⊃
(:⊃)
x:(P ∧ ¬t · x:P ) ⊃
(⊃ ¬)
⊃ ¬x:(P ∧ ¬t · x:P )
P,¬ ⊞ P,⊟(P ∧ ¬⊞ P ) ⊃ P
P,P ⊃ P
( ⊃)
P ⊃ P
(⊃ )
P,P,⊟(P ∧ ¬⊞ P ) ⊃ ⊞P
(⊃ ¬)
P,⊟(P ∧ ¬⊞ P ) ⊃ ⊞P,¬P
(¬ ⊃)
P,¬⊞ P,⊟(P ∧ ¬⊞ P ) ⊃ ¬P
(⊃ ∧)
P,¬⊞ P,⊟(P ∧ ¬⊞ P ) ⊃ P ∧ ¬P
(∧ ⊃)
P ∧ ¬⊞ P,⊟(P ∧ ¬⊞ P ) ⊃ P ∧ ¬P
( ⊃)
⊟(P ∧ ¬⊞ P ) ⊃ P ∧ ¬P
(⊃ )
P,⊟(P ∧ ¬⊞ P ) ⊃ ⊞(P ∧ ¬P ),⊞P
P,¬P ⊃ P
(∧ ⊃)
P ∧ ¬P ⊃ P
(⊃→)
⊃ P ∧ ¬P → P
(⊃ )
P,⊟(P ∧ ¬⊞ P ) ⊃ ⊞(P ∧ ¬P → P ),⊞P
(Cut)
P,⊟(P ∧ ¬⊞ P ) ⊃ ⊞P
(¬ ⊃)
P,¬⊞ P,⊟(P ∧ ¬⊞ P ) ⊃
(∧ ⊃)
P ∧ ¬⊞ P,⊟(P ∧ ¬⊞ P ) ⊃
( ⊃)
⊟(P ∧ ¬⊞ P ) ⊃
(⊃ ¬)
⊃ ¬⊟ (P ∧ ¬⊞ P )
2
2
The last corollary gives us a close relationship between prehistoric relations
in G3lp and occurrences of terms in (⊃:) rules. But it does not differentiate
between the two variants (⊃:)c and (⊃:)t used for introducing elements from CS
and input formulas t:A . It is therefore necessary to expand the definition of self-
referentiality by considering all basic justifications and not only the justification
constants:
Definition 48 (Inputs). The inputs IN of a G3lp proof are all LP formulas
that are the principal formula of a (⊃:)t or (⊃:)c rule.
Notice that the used constant specifications CS is a subset of the inputs
IN. The interpretation here is that (⊃:)t introduces arguments to Skolem style
functions by proving the trivial identity function t:A → t:A. So we have two
different clearly marked sources of basic proofs in G3lp, on the one hand there
are the constants justifying known axioms, on the other hand there are presup-
posed existing proofs or arguments to proof functions. Based on this expanded
notion, we can also expand the definition of self-referentiality to input sets:
Definition 49 (Self-Referential Inputs). A input set IN is
• directly self-referential if there is a term t such that t:A(t) ∈ IN.
• self-referential if there is a subset A ⊆ IN such that
A := {t0:A(t1), . . . , tn−1:A(t0).
With this definitions we finally arrive at our main result, a counterpart to
Yu’s theorem.
Theorem 50. If the input set IN of a G3lp proof is non-self-referential, then
the proof is prehistoric-cycle-free.
Proof. We show the contraposition. Assume there is a prehistoric cycle
i0 ≺ i1 ≺ · · · ≺ in−1 ≺ i0.
By corollary 47 there exists formulas sk:Ak in IN such that tik ∈ sub(Ak) and
sk ∈ sub(tik′ ) with k
′ := k + 1 mod n. From the latter and tik′ ∈ sub(Ak′ )
follows sk ∈ sub(Ak′ ). So {sk:Ak |0 ≤ k < n} ⊆ IN is a self-referential subset
of IN. 
Corollary 51. The forgetful projection A◦ of an LP formula A provable with
a non-self-referential input set IN is provable prehistoric-cycle-free in G3s.
Proof. Suppose that T is a proof of A from non-self-referential inputs IN. Then
T is prehistoric-cycle-free as proven above. So by corollary 45 T ◦ is a prehistoric-
cycle-free proof of A◦ in G3s+(Cut). Finally there is a prehistoric-cycle-free
proof of A◦ in G3s by corollary 33. 
4.3 Counterexample
The main result of the last section does not exactly match Yu’s result. We have
shown that prehistoric cycles in G3s are sufficient for self-referentiality but only
for the expanded definition of self-referentiality considering the set of all inputs
IN. The question arises if this expansion is actually necessary. The following
counterexample shows that indeed, prehistoric cycles in G3s are not sufficient
for needing a self-referential CS.
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Lemma 52. The S4 formula A ≡ (P ∧ ¬P → P ) → ¬(P ∧ ¬P ) has a
realization in LPG0.
Proof. Set Ar ≡ y:(P ∧ ¬y · x:P → P )→ ¬x:(P ∧ ¬y · x:P ). We have
y:(P ∧ ¬y · x:P → P ) ⊢LPG0 ¬x:(P ∧ ¬y · x:P )
by the same derivation as for LP ⊢ ¬x:(P ∧¬t · x:P ) replacing the introduction
of t:(P ∧¬t ·x:P → P ) by the assumption y:(P ∧¬y ·x:P → P ) and t by y. So by
the deduction theorem LPG0 ⊢ y:(P ∧¬y ·x:P → P )→ ¬x:(P ∧¬y ·x:P ).4 
Lemma 53. The S4 formula (P ∧ ¬P → P ) → ¬(P ∧ ¬P ) has no
prehistoric-cycle-free proof.
Proof. By inversion for G3s in one direction and an easy deduction in the other,
we have
G3s ⊢⊃ (P ∧ ¬P → P )→ ¬(P ∧ ¬P )
iff
G3s ⊢ (P ∧ ¬P → P ),(P ∧ ¬P ) ⊃ .
In both directions the proofs remain prehistoric-cycle-free if the other proof was
prehistoric-cycle-free. For a proof of (P ∧¬P → P ),(P ∧¬P ) ⊃ we have
two possibilities for the last rule:
1. case: The last rule is a ( ⊃) rule with (P ∧¬P → P ) as the principal
formula. Then the following proof tree shows that we need a proof for the
sequent P,(P ∧ ¬P → P ),(P ∧¬P ) ⊃ which is just the original sequent
weakened by P on the left:
P ∧ ¬P,(P ∧ ¬P → P ),(P ∧ ¬P ) ⊃ P ∧ ¬P
( ⊃)
(P ∧ ¬P → P ),(P ∧ ¬P ) ⊃ P ∧ ¬P P,(P ∧ ¬P → P ),(P ∧ ¬P ) ⊃
(→⊃)
P ∧ ¬P → P,(P ∧ ¬P → P ),(P ∧ ¬P ) ⊃
( ⊃)
(P ∧ ¬P → P ),(P ∧ ¬P ) ⊃
So for the remaining of the proof we will have to check if weakening P on
the left helps to construct a prehistoric-cycle-free proof.
2. case: The last rule is a ( ⊃) rule with (P ∧ ¬P ) as the principal
formula. We get as premise the sequent
P ∧ ¬P,(P ∧ ¬P → P ),(P ∧ ¬P ) ⊃,
which again by inversion and an easy deduction is provable prehistoric-cycle-free
iff P,(P ∧ ¬P → P ),(P ∧ ¬P ) ⊃ P is provable prehistoric-cycle-free.
It is clear that using ( ⊃) rules on this sequent just adds additional copies of
the existing formulas by the same arguments. So by contraction if there is a
prehistoric-cycle-free proof for this sequent, then there is also one ending in a
(⊃ ) rule. The premise of this rule has to have the form
(P ∧ ¬P → P ) ⊃ P
to avoid a prehistoric cycle. But the following Kripke model shows that
(P ∧ ¬P → P )→ P
4If we assume that P ∧¬y ·x:P → P is an axiom A0, this matches the more general result
in corollary 7.2 in Artemov [2]: LP(CS) ⊢ F if and only if LPG0 ⊢ CS ⊃ F .
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is not a theorem of S4 and therefore not provable at all:
W := w, val(P ) := ∅, R := {(w,w)}.
We have w  P ∧ ¬P → P because w  ¬P and therefore also
w  ¬(P ∧ ¬P ).
As w is the only world we get w  (P ∧ ¬P → P ) which leads to the final
w  ¬((P ∧ ¬P → P )→ P ) again because w  ¬P .
As all possibilities for a prehistoric-cycle-free proof of
(P ∧ ¬P → P ),(P ∧ ¬P ) ⊃
are exhausted, there is no such proof and therefore also no prehistoric-cycle-free
proof of ⊃ (P ∧ ¬P → P )→ ¬(P ∧ ¬P ) 
Theorem 54. There exists a S4-theorem A and a LP-formula B such that A
has no prehistoric-cycle-free G3s-proof, B◦ = A and LP(CS⊙) ⊢ B
Proof. A := (P ∧ ¬P → P )→ ¬(P ∧ ¬P ) is a theorem of S4, as
¬(P ∧ ¬P )
already is a theorem of S4. By the previous lemma, there is no prehistoric-cycle-
free proof for A and by the first lemma
B := y:(P ∧ ¬y · x:P → P )→ ¬x:(P ∧ ¬y · x:P )
is a realization of A provable in LP0 and therefor also in LP(CS
⊙). 
Finally the question arises if prehistoric cycles are also a necessary condition
on self-referential S4 theorems under the expanded definition. For this it is
necessary to clarify the term inputs for Hilbert style proofs used in the original
definition of LP and in the realization theorem (thm. 14) as there is no direct
equivalent for (⊃:)t rules in the Hilbert style LP calculus as there is for (⊃:)c
rules. Looking at the adequacy proof for G3lp, (⊃:)t is used only for the base
cases A ⊃ A in proofing axioms of LP. In the other direction, a (⊃:)t rule is
translated first to the trivial proof for t:A ⊢LP t:A, but the usage of deduction
theorem could change that to a different proof for example for ⊢LP t:A→ t:A.
So far, the situation seems pretty clear cut, and we have inputs as assump-
tions or as subformulas with negative polarity of formulas proven by the de-
duction theorem. This also matches the notion that (⊃:)t rules introduce the
arguments of Skolem functions used in the LP realization. Unfortunately the
deductions as constructed in the deduction theorem sometimes use existing for-
mulas with swapped polarities. That is, in a deduction constructed by the
deduction theorem, subformulas can occur with negative polarity which only
occurred with positive polarity in the original deduction. Moreover formulas
can be necessary to derive the final formula without occurring in that formula.
So there is no guarantee that all necessary inputs actually occur in the final
formula or that a formula occurring with negative polarity somewhere in the
proof is an input.
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So we have no clear definition of inputs in the original definition of LP
matching the definition of inputs in G3lp, and therefore also currently no way
to expand Yu’s result to all inputs. But we can stipulate that the inputs of a
derivation d as constructed by the realization theorem are exactly the realiza-
tions of formulas ⊟iA with negative polarity in the original G3s proof. As G3s
enjoys the subformula property, that means all inputs used in the proof thus
constructed are actually also inputs in the final formula of the proof, a property
which does not necessarily hold for all derivations as discussed above. We have
to assume without proof that this definition of inputs somehow matches the
exact definition given in the context of G3lp proofs. That is, there exists a G3lp
proof for a G3s proof where only realizations of formulas with negative polarity
are introduced by (⊃:)t. Given this stipulations and assumptions, the following
sketch of a proof tries to argue for the necessity of prehistoric cycles for the
expanded definition of self-referentiality:
Conjecture 55. If a S4-theorem A has a left-prehistoric-cycle-free G3s-proof,
then there is a LP-formula B s.t. B◦ = A and LP(IN⊙) ⊢ B.
Proof idea. Given a left-prehistoric-cycle-free G3s-proof T = (T,R) for A,
use the realization theorem to construct a realization function rNT and a constant
specification CSN such that B := rNT (anT (A)) is a realization of A and LP ⊢ B
by the constructed deduction d. To simplify the following, we do not enforce a
injective constant specification here and allow multiple proof constants for the
same formula. From this it follows that any constant ci,j,k is exclusively used
when handling the (⊃ ) rule Ri,j .
Assume for a contradiction that the set of inputs IN used for d is self-
referential. That is there is a subset {t0:A0(t1), . . . , tn−1:An−1(t0)} of IN. The
occurrences of tk+1 mod n in tk:Ai have to be a subterm of realization term
for a principal family ik as the construction of such realization terms are the
only place where the constants and variables of IN can get reused. For every
consecutive pair of principal families ik and ik′ thus given, there is a constant
or variable tk′ such that tk′ occurs in the realization term for ik and there is a
subterm of the realization term for ik′ occurring in tk′ :Ak′ ∈ IN. We distinguish
the following cases:
1. case: tk′ is a variable xj . Then the formula tk′ :Ak′ is the realization of an
annotated S4 formula ⊟jA(⊞ik′ ). That formula occurs on the left of a (⊃ )
rule introducing an occurrence of ⊞k as xj is in the realization term of ⊞k.
Therefore we have ik′ ≺ ik.
2. case: tk′ is a constant cj,l,m. Then the formula tk′ :Ak′ is added to the CS
when handling a (⊃ ) rule Rj,l introducing an occurrence of ⊞j . cj,l,m is in
the realization term of ⊞k so Rj,l lies in a prehistory of ⊞k. At the same time,
the term tk′ occurs in the formula cj,l,m:Ak′ as part of a term t used in the
construction of the realization of ⊞k′ . As cj,l,m:Ak′ is introduced when realizing
Rj,l, Ak′ occurs in the proof of the premise and there has to be an occurrence
of ⊞k′ in the prehistory of Rj,l. Together we get that ⊞k′ occurs in a prehistory
of ⊞k and therefore ik′ ≺ ik by lemma 19.-
So for all k < n we get ik′ ≺ ik and the list of principal families i0, . . . , in−1
is therefore a prehistoric cycle in T .
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5 Conclusion
We defined prehistoric relations for Gentzen systems with cut rules and finally
for a Gentzen system G3lp for the logic of proofs LP. This makes it possible to
study prehistoric relations directly in LP and leads to a negative answer on Yu’s
conjecture that prehistoric cycles are sufficient for self-referential S4 theorems. It
also leads to an expanded definition of self-referentiality considering all inputs
used to construct justification terms. With that expanded definition of self-
referentiality prehistoric cycles are sufficient for self-referential theorems in S4,
which is the main result of this paper.
Given this expansion, the question goes back to the other direction. That
is, are prehistoric cycles also necessary for the expanded definition of self-
referentiality? Unfortunately this question is not easy to answer, as already
transferring the definitions of inputs to the original Hilbert style calculus poses
problems. A more detailed discussion of Skolem style functions and their role in
LP realizations will hopefully help to clear this up. It is possible that the defi-
nition of input variables relative to a subformula occurrence and the machinery
used to work with input variables in [13] already provides a part of the answer.
Yu [17] expanded his result to modal logics T and K4 and their justification
counterparts. Another open question is whether the same generalization can be
done with the results of this paper. That is, if there are Gentzen style systems
without structural rules for T and K4 together with a consistent definition of
term correspondence and prehistoric relations and a translation to some variant
of G3s.
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